Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1979

State of Utah v. Charles F. Conrad : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Robert B. Hansen; Attorney for Appellant;
Walter R. Ellett; Attorney for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State v. Conrad, No. 15922 (Utah Supreme Court, 1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1326

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

• ,.,-I

. >'

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 159.22

-vsCHARLES F. CONRAD,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGME!f'I' 0'' ~u.·
DISTRICT COURT OF WEBElt'COO'N'I,'i.
HONORABLE JOHN F, wAHLQTJ;ES'I' 1 · a1Hilll,~~t)~~

23'6 State
Salt Lake
Attorneys for

WALTER R. ELLETT
5085 South State Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Attorney for Appellant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEHENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE -------------- 1
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT ------------------- 1
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL -------------------------- 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS

----------------------------- 2

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR
IN REFUSING TO GRANT A NEW
TRIAL INASNUCH AS APPELLANT'S
"NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE"
WAS MERELY CUMULATIVE, l-vOULD
NOT HAVE CHANGED THE RESULT
AT TRIAL AND THERE IS NO
SHOWING OF ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ------------------ 6

POINT II:

A JURY'S VERDICT HUST NOT BE
DISTURBED ON APPEAL HERELY
BECAUSE IT IS BASED ON UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF
THE VICTIH, UNLESS SUCH
TESTIMONY IS COMPLETELY
UNBELIEVABLE ---------------- 14

CONCLUSION --------------------------------------- 20
CASES CITED
Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 57 P. 2d 708
(1936) --------------------------------Johnson v. Doctorman, 23 Utah 2d 214, 462 P. 2d
169 (1969) ----------------------------Lee v. Howes, 548 P. 2d 619 (Utah, 1976) --------Moser v. Zion's Co-op Herchanti1e Inst., 114
Utah 58, 197 P. 2d 136 (1948) ---------Smith v. Shreeve, 551 P. 2d 1261 (Utah, 1976) ----

11, 13
13
13
13
13

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-i-

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(Continued)
Page
State v. Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201 P. 2d 764
(1949)
State v. Estrada, 119 Utah 339, 227 P. 2d 247
(1951)
State v. Harris, 30 Utah 2d 77' 513 P. 2d 438
(1973)
State v. Jiron, 27 Utah 2d 21, 492 P. 2d 983
(1972)
State v. Middelstadt, 579 P. 2d 908 (Utah, 1978)-State v. Mills, 530 P. 2d 1272 (Utah, 1975) -----State v. Molitz, 40 Utah 443, 122 P. 86 (1912) --State v. Montgomery, 37 Utah 515, 109 P. 815
(1910)
State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P. 2d 973
(1947)
State v. Romero, 554 P. 2d 216 (Utah, 1976) -----State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110' 307 P. 2d 212
(1957)
State " \'Ieaver, 78 Utah 555, 6 P. 2d 167 (1931)-State v. Wilson, 565 P. 2d 66 (Utah, 1977) -------

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

12, 13
14
12
10-13
15, 17
14, 17
ll

12
14
14, 17
14
ll

15

STATUTES CITED

-------------------------------------------

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (Supp. 1977)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-38-l et seq. (1953' as
amended)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-38-3 (7) (1953, as amended)

l
8
8. 14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-ii-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 15922

CHARLES F. CONRAD,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with aggravated robbery in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (Supp. 1977).
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty
of one count of robbery on July 18, 1977, in the sedond
Judicial District, in and for Weber County, State of Utah,
the Honorable John F. Wahlquist presiding.

On August 8, 1977,

appellant was sentenced to a term of not less than five years
and which may be for life in the Utah State Prison.

Appellant

was further sentenced to an additional five years because of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the use of a gun.

The two terms were to run consecutively.

At the rehearing of appellant's motion for a new
trial on May 22, 1978, Judge Wahlquist struck the additional
term

of five years for the use of a firearm.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the verdict and

judgments of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On.April 15, 1977, at approximately 7:45p.m., the
By-Rite Gas Station, 809 28th Street, Ogden, Utah, was robbed
by a single gunman.

Kim Reed, the attendant on duty at the

time, was commanded at gunpoint to open the till and give
the assailant the money (Tr. 5) which was later determined to
be $34.90 (Tr. 9).

After the robber had taken the money, he

forced Reed to walk to the car wash area adjacent to the
service station, then the robber fled on foot along 28th
Street (Tr. 10-12).

Reed testified that he observed a faded

oxidized red "Toyota or Datsun" automobile parked in the
end bay that pulled away from the station down Honroe Street
just as the robber was fleeing down 28th Street (Tr. 12-13,
43).

Two customers were getting gas at the time of the

robbery, but when Reed asked one if he had seen the incident t'
replied he had not.

(Tr. 26).
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Reed called the police immediately upon returning
to the gas station office and then continued to wait on
customers until the officers arrived (Tr. 25).

After the

officers arrived and made an investigation, Reed went to
police headquarters with Officer Deloy White (Tr. 13).

Reed

was shown 84 "mug shots" of suspect persons and picked out
appellant's photo claiming, "This [is] the guy that had the
gun."

(Tr. 13-14; R.

[2a]).

Appellant was subsequently

arrested and charged with aggravated robbery (R. 1, 8).
During the investigation and at trial, it was
learned that the oxidized car belonged to Yolanda Gomez, a
close friend of appellant's, who had loaned the car to
appellant that night (Tr. 79-80).

It was also learned that

LeRoy Guiterrez, a friend of appellant's, was with appellant
on the night in question (Tr. 83-84, 217-218).
At trial, appellant advanced two alternative
defenses:

first, an 'llibi defense; and second, that the offense

committed was not aggravated robbery, but a simple till tap.
As to the first defense, appellant offered six
witnesses who testified as to appellant's whereabouts from
5:30 p.m~ until about 9:30 p.m. on April 15, 1977 (Tr. 143152; 153-166; 204-214; 214-225; 229-240; 260-268).

These

witnesses did not all place appellant at a single location at
any one given time and the testimony taken as a whole, is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.
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inconsistent not only with the defense's case itself, but
also with Yolanda Gomez' testimony who, although she is a
close friend of appellant's, was called as an adverse witness
for the prosecution.

(Tr. 76-113) .

The r~ore important of the two defenses was appellant
second claim that the offense was only a
"till tap"

theft.

class B misdemeanor

Appellant argues that he and Guiterrez

schemed together to steal from the By-Rite station by creatins
a distraction in one of the car wash bays

(Tr.

279-280).

They planned to cut a rubber hose on a spray gun in one of the
wash bays and then ask Reed to come look at the problem
leaving the station's till unattended (Tr.
at

tr::.e<~

282-283).

Testimor

from both Reed and appellant indicates that the two

did cut the hose and lured Reed from the station -::>ffice (Tr.
30-31, 363; 282-292).

Reed, however, testified that the cut

hose incident occurred about one-half hour before the aggravat'
robbery occurred (Tr. 30, 363).
It was also brought out in Reed's testimony that
the cash box on the office counter was bolted down and always
locked (Tr. 22-24).
key

Reed testified that he ah;ays had the

on a key ring on his person and never left the key in

the cash box lock (Tr. 22-24).

Reed said this was the case

on April 15 when he left the office to inspect the damaged
car wash hose.

(Tr. 24).
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1

On several occasions during the trial, Reed
re-affirmed his claim that appellant, Charles Conrad, did
indeed hold a pistol on him and demanded money from the
By-Rite Gas Station cash box.
362-363).

(Tr. 7-8; 57-61; 67; 74;

Reed was also positive in his identification

of appellant, Charles Conrad, as the gunman who committed
the robbery on April 15, 1977 (Tr. 6; 13-14).
After both sides had rested,the jury was instructed
and given four alternative verdicts to return:
robbery;

(2) robbery;

acquittal (R. 39-42).

(l) aggravated

(3) classB misdemeanor theft; or (4)
After deliberating 46 minutes after a

three day trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the
charge of aggravated robbery (R. 38).
Prior to trial, appellant moved for a continuance
in order to have more time to locate LeRoy Guiterrez in order
to call him as a defense witness (R. 15-17).

When the motion

was denied (R. 21) , the court reserved the right to reconsider
the motion if all defense witnesses were not served.

~fuen

the trial and sentencing were completed, appellant moved for
a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence having
since located Guiterrez (Tr. 69-71).

This motion was also

denied but the court again reserved the right to reconsider
if Guiterrez would present himself in court and offered
whatever further evidence he had on the matter (R. 81).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

Appellant appealed this denial of a new trial to
the Utah Supreme Court, but upon motion of the defendant, i.t

1

remanded to the Second District Court for reconsideration
(R. 468).

At the reconsideration hearing, Judge Wahlquist

determined that since Guiterrez' testimony was inconsistent
with appellant's alibi defense and also that it would not

have made a difference in the outcome of the trial, the motion
for a new trial was denied (R. 478).
five year

Also, the additional

term for the use of the firearm was struck by

Judge \vahlquist at this rehearing (R. 478-480).
Appellant now appeals that denial of a new trial
to this court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
REFUSING TO GRANT A NE\'7 TRIAL
INASHUCH AS APPELLANT'S "NEVi'LY
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE" WAS MERELY
CUMULATIVE, WOULD NOT HAVE CHANGED
THE RESULT AT TRIAL, AND THERE IS
NO SHOWING OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
About six weeks before trial, appellant filed an
affidavit with the ;trial court asking for a continuance of
trial because LeRoy Guiterrez .'!las not available to testify
(R. 15-17).

In fact, Guiterrez was a fugitive from the 1~

enforcement officers and was avoiding the police (R. 16).
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The motion for continuance was denied (R. 21) with Judge
Wahlquist reserving judgment as to the importance of any
witnesses not called to be determined at trial.
On August 12, 1977, appellant filed an affidavit
with the court asking for a new trial on the basis of newly
discovered evidence declaring that Guiterrez was then available to testify.

The court denied the motion on September

27, 1977, but offered to reconsider the motion "if the claimed
witness appears in court and presents his testimony for the
record."

(R. 81).

Appellant then appealed this denial of

a new trial to this court, and, upon motion of appellant, the
matter was remitted to the trial court.
Remittance, No. 15374, March 31, 1978,

(See State v. Conrad,
(R. 468)).

At the reconsideration hearing held on May 22, 1978,
Judge Wahlquist considered the affidavit of Guiterrez's version
of the incident.

The court concluded that the affidavit was

"absolutely inconsistent \vith the testimony given" by Kim
Reed and also inconsistent with appellant's alibi defense
(R. 479-480).

Judge Wahlquist ruled:

"Insofar as the motion is concerned,
considering the testimony that was given
from the defense is inconsistent to-tal 1ly
with this testimony now given, that i t
could not intelligently have presented
both this testimony [admission of cornmission of a crime) and the defens~ which
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he did present [alibi defense) which
was defeated.
In the total of the
situation, I do not think this witness
would have made a difference.
For
that reason, I w1ll deny the motion
for a new trial."
(Emphasis added)
(R. 478)
Appellant now claims that this ruling by Judge
Wahlquist improperly denied him his right to a new trial.
The statutory requirements for the granting of a new trial
are set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-38-1 et seq.
amended).

(1953, as

Section 78-38-3 outlines the grounds for new trials'

and subsection 7 deals precisely with the point raised on
this appeal:
"When a verdict or decision has been
rendered against the defendant the court
may, ~pon his application, grant a new
trial in the following cases only:

* * *
(7) When new evidence has been
discovered, material to the defendant
and which he could not:with reasonable
diligence have discovered and produced
at the trial."
(Emphasis added).
Thus, if the newly discovered evidence is not
material to the defendant or it can be shown that the defendant did not make

reasonable efforts to discover the

evidence before trial, then the new trial will not be granted.
While this latter requirement was questioned by the state at
the rehearing (R. 475-476), respondent \vill assume, arguendo,
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I

that appellant did use reasonable diligence in attempting
to locate Guiterrez before trial.

However, the former

requirement was the gist of Judge %'ahlquist's ruling; that is,
appellant did not show by the Guiterrez affidavit that the
evidence was "material to the defendant."
Appellant notes in his brief that "for some unknown
reason" the affidavit of Guiterrez is not included in the
present case's record, but is included in the record of the
previous appeal.
affidavit to refer

Respondent is unable to locate the alleged
this court to in either court records.

But assuming, arguendo, that it does exist somewhere, Judge
Wahlquist's rulings are most persuasive.

The appellant

advanced two alternative defenses at trial:

(1) an alibi

defense; and (2) that the committed crime was not a robbery,
but merely a till tap (class B theft).
affidavit accomplishes two results.

Thus, the Guiterrez

First, it completely

undermines the alibi defense alternative since the affidavit
admits that Guiterrez and appellant were both at the By-Rite
gas station on the night in question and at the incriminating
time.

(The alibi defense was also discredited by appellant

himself when he took the stand and admitted being at the
By-Rite station and participating in a crime that night
(Tr. 279-292)).
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The affidavit also results in nothing rnore than a
cumulative restatement of appellant's testimony at trial.
Appellant admits this in his brief where he states:
. . the testimony of LeRoy
Guiterrez is completely supportive of
the appellant's testimony given in his
defense at the time of trial."
(Appellant's
brief, p. 6).
Appellant's admission that the affidavit is only
"supportive of appellant's testimony" is an admission that the
evidence is merely cumulative which was precisely the issue
dealt

with in the case of State v. Jiron, 27 Utah 2d 21,

492 P. 2d 983 (1972).

In Jiron, defendant was convicted of

robbery and he appealed claiming, inter alia, that he should
be ;ranted a new trial.

Defendant based this claim on the

fact that his wife was in Colorado at the time of his trial
and therefore could not testify as to his whereabouts on the
night in question.

After trial, defendant's wife swore out

an affidavit and testified to basically the same story defendant had given at trial.

In upholding the trial court's

denial of a new trial on defendant's claim of newly discovered
evidence, this court ruled:
"The wife's testimony is merely
cumulative to defendant's;
Finally, the facts recited in the
affidavit are not of the type that
would indicate the probability of a
different result upon the retrial of
the case.
From the foregoing there
is insufficient basis upon which to
predicate a determination that the
trial court abused its discretion."
492 P. 2d at 985.
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Thus, where "new" evidence is only cumulative in its
effect, the matter is left to the judgment of the trial court
to determine whether a new trial should be granted.

Also

where, in that judgment, it appears that a new trial would
result in the same verdict, a new trial motion may properly
be denied.
This principle was also advanced by the Utah Court
in State v. Molitz, 40 Utah 443, 122 P. 86 (1912), and State
v. Weaver, 78 Utah 555, 6 P. 2d 167 (1931).

The Molitz case

held that it was proper to deny a motion for a new trial
where defendant's newly discovered evidence was only cumulative.
In the present case, Judge Wahlquist's determination
that Guiterrez's affidavit was merely a further corroboration
of appellant's own testimony given at trial triggers the application of the Jiron and Molitz cases.

As above noted,

these two cases would affirm the denied new trial motion on
the basis of Guiterrez's affidavit being "merely cumulative."
Another principle which trial courts must resolve
is whether the newly discovered evidence would result in a
different outcome at trial.

Several Utah cases hold that a

new trial can only be granted where such a probability of a
different result is likely.
In Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 57 P. 2d 708
(1916), the court ruled:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"It is only unde~ very special
circumsta.nces .
. that ne1·1 trials
are granted to allow the defeated party
to add cumulative evidence, newly
discovered, and then only where there
is a clear probability that tre result
of a new trial will be different."
(Emphasis added.)
57 P. 2d at 723.
In accord, State v. Montgomery, 37 Utah 515, 109
P.

815 (1910); State v. Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201 P. 2d

764 (1949); State v. Harris, 30 Utah 2d 77,

513 P.

2d 438

(1973); and State v. Jiron, supra.
This is precisely the basis of Judge Wahlquist's
ruling.

He forcefully determined that "[i]n the total of thE

situation, I do not think this witness [Guiterrez] would
made a difference."
3ui~e=rez

(R.

478).

~w

In other words, even had

testified at trial, Judge Wahlquist, who

presid~

at both the trial and the rehearing of the motion, determine(
that there was no likelihood that "the result of a new trial
will be different."

Id.

One final consideration of the granting of new
trials needs to be dealt with here.

The reviewing court wiL

only reverse a lower court's ruling if an abuse of trial
court discretion is shown.
positive on this point.

State v. Harris, supra, is dis-

In considering defendant's appeal

from a denied motion for a new trial in Harris, this court
ruled:
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"It is a matter solely within the
discretion of the trial court as to
whether it should grant a new trial on
the ground of newlv discovered evidence.
This court cannot substltute its discretion for that of the trial court whose
ruling will be sustained, unless it' is
clearly indicated that it abused or
failed to exercise its discretion.
The
denial of such a motion will be deemed
an abuse of discretion only in such
instances where there is a grave suspicion
that justice may have been miscarried
because of the lack of enlightenment on a
vital point, which the new evidence will
supply . .
If there be evidence
before the court upon which reasonable
men might differ as to whether or not
the defendant is guilty, the trial court
may deny a motion for a new trial."
513 P, 2d at 439-440.
(Emphasis added)
This legal principle regarding trial court discretion
in the granting of new trials is soundly imbedded in Utah
case law and has been cited by this Court on numerous occasions.
(Jensen v. Logan City, supra; Hoser v. Zion's Co-op. Herchantile
Inst., 114 Utah 58, 197 P. 2d 136 (1948); State v. Cooper, supra;
Johnson v. Doctorman, 23 Utah 2d 214, 462 P. 2d 169 (1969);
State v. Jiron, supra; Lee v. Howes, 548 P. 2d 619

(Utah, 1976);

Smith v. Shreeve, 551 P. 2d 1261 (Utah, 1976) .)
Thus, appellant's claim that he was improperly
denied a new trial only has merit if he can show that Judge
Wahlquist abused his discretion.
except to assert such abuse.

This appellant has not done

On the contrary, a careful

review of the record reveals a very thoughtful and fair treatment
of appellant's claim of newly discovered evidence.

After
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examination of such and when viewed in the context of the
entire case, Judge WahlqGist correctly determined that the
Guiterrez's affidavit was only cumulative, would not have
resulted in a different jury verdict and in so concluding
he did not abuse his discretion.

This conclusion is a proper

application of U.C.A. § 78 -38-3 which, as above noted, restri
the granting of a new trial on the ground of newly
evidence,

discov~~

to such evidence which is "material to the defenda
Respondent asserts that Judge Wahlquist's ruling

was proper in light of the above and submits that appellant''
request for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence is not justified by the facts of the case.
POINT II.
A JURY'S VERDICT MUST NOT BE
DISTURBED ON APPEl'.L MERELY
BECAUSE IT IS BASED ON UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF THE
VICTIM, UNLESS SUCH TESTIMONY
IS COMPLETELY UNBELIEVEABLE.
It is a well settled axiom of criminal law in ~~
state that the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of
witnesses.

(State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P. 2d

212 (1957)); State v. Estrada, 119 Utah 339, 227 P. 2d 247
(1951); State v. Moore, lll Utah 458, 183 P. 2d 973 (1947);
State v. Mills, 530 P. 2d 1272 (Utah, 1975); State v. Romero
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554 P. 2d 216 (Utah, 1976); and State v. Hilson, 565 P. 2d
66 (Utah, 1977)).
The more narrow question here involves the credibility
of the victim of the crime, Kim Reed, who gave uncorroborated
testimony at trial of the events of the robbery (Tr. 1-75).
Appellant cites the recent case of State v. Middelstadt, 579
P. 2d 908

(Utah, 1978), which sets out the basis on which a

reviewing court must deal with uncorroborated evidence.
"In general, the common-lav; supports
the contention that a conviction may be
sustained upon the uncorroborated testimony
of the victim, and that such evidence is
not insubstantial simply because the
testimony is conflicting in some respects.
As to the quality of the test1mony given,
it is settled that it must be so improbable
that it is completely unbelievable before
it is insufficient to uphold a conviction.
We do not find that to be the case here."
(Emphasis added.)
579 P. 2d at 911.
Appellant claims that Reed's testimony of appellant robbing
him with two customers present should be categorized in the
"so improbable that it is completely unbelievable" category.
Appellant notes that the customers were not asked by Reed
to tell police what they saw, that, in fact, the customers
did not even notice a gunman walking away from the gas
station office, and that Reed continued to wait on customers
calmly without asking for their assistance.

This is a mistaken

reading of the trial transcript by appellant.
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Reed did testify that he asked one customer if he
sawanything, and the customer answered he only "saw a
gentleman up there, but that was it"

(Tr. 26).

Reed also

testified that it would have been very difficult for the
customers to have seen the gun in the man's hand since it wa·
dusk at about 7:45 p.m. and the gas station lights were on
(Tr. 5, 12), the office windows are at about "chest level'
(Tr. 180), the bottom half are painted over and the top half
has lettering painted on them (Tr. 35), and the two customer:
were 50 to 60 feet away (Tr. 62), getting gas at the pumps
furthest from the office (Tr. 26).
As to his waiting on customers after the event
without requesting their aid, Reed had already asked one
customer if he saw anything suspicious and was told he had
not (Tr. 26).

Respondent submits that Reed's behavior, ther

fore, was not unusual--after being told by the customer that
hadn't seen anything peculiar, he continued to wait on custc
until the police arrived (Tr. 26).
No where in the record does any witness testify
appellant backed out of the office with gun in hand, as
in appellant's brief (p. 19).

~

ooU

Reed testified that after t~

robber took the money, the robber commanded him to walk eve
to the car wash area and they both left the off ice together
(Tr. 10, 25).
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Respondent submits that Reed's testimony is not
"completely unbelievable," as witnessed by the jury's 46
minute deliberation after a three-day trial and verdict of
guilty (R. 38).
In State v. Romero, supra, the Utah court ruled,
with regard to a reviewing court's weighing the evidence,
that:
"This court has long upheld the
standard that on an appeal from conviction the court cannot weigh the
evidence.
. . . Further, this court
has maintained that its function is
not to determine guilt or innocence,
the weight to give conflicting evidence,
the credibility of witnesses, or the
weight to be given defendant's testimony.
'We are concerned only with the question
of the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain the convictions by showing
that the jury would have found beyond
a reasonable doubt that defendants
were guilty.'"
554 P. 2d at 218.
This jury role was also echoed in State v. Mills,
supra, where this court said:
"It is the prerogative of the
jury to judge the weight of the evidence,
the credibility of witnesses, and the
facts to be found therefrom."
530 P. 2d at 1272
And as to the specific evidentiary matter of uncorroborated testimony, State v. Middlestadt, holds:
" . . . there is no rule governing
how many witnesses are needed or that
the testimony need be corroborated by
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other evidence b~fore the trier
of fact can decide how to determine
the weight of the testimony."
579
P. 2d at 911.
Appellant attempts to discredit the victim Reed's
testimony by distorting the record and claims that the
"only believable portion of Reed's testimony is that
found on page 142 of the record .

(p.

19).

port~n

Respondent

would only point out that the testimony on page 142 of the
record (Tr. 58) is an out of context statement made in response to the leading questions of defense counsel during
cross-examination.

The actual exchange is quoted below:

[Mr. Farr) Q.
You came back, found
the cash box was open, and so you called
the police and reported it, told them
that the person that had taken i t had
a g·un?
[Mr. Reed) A.

Right.

* * *
Q.
So you told them about the
gun and you remembered Freddy Conrad
because he had just been in there, and
you later then identified him as the
person with the gun?
A.
As I stated, it didn't happen
that way."
(Tr. 58; R. 142)
Thus, where appellant cites to page 142 of the
record as the only portion of the trial where Reed was
believable, respondent answers that defense counsel, in an
attempt to confuse and have Reed contradict his earlier stoq,
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offered defendant's version of the incident in question
form.

Reed answered "Right" to the portion of the question

dealing with the gun being used, but then one question later,
refuses to go along with defense counsel's leading questions
and re-asserts his earlier position.

This is hardly an

admission that defendant's story was at that point adopted
by Reed or that Reed was only believable when he replied
"right" to a multi-faceted, leading question.
Respondent contends that the above authority, when
applied to an accurate reading of the trial record, leads
to only one conclusion:

the uncorroborated

testimony of Kim

Reed was sufficient, substantial and believable.

The jury

was, therefore, within its prerogative when it determined
appellant's guilt.
CONCLUSION
The appellant's claim of an improper denial of a
new trial is not supportable since the Guiterrez affidavit
was merely cumulative evidence, would not have resulted in
a different jury verdict and there is no showing of any
abuse of discretion by the trial court in its rulino.
The uncorroborated testimony of Kim Reed is not
Qer se a deficient form of evidence and can onlv be deemed
insufficient where the court finds the testimnn~ tn hA
"completely unbelievable."

The

iury's verdict which relied
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on Reed's testimony is therefore a proper one since a careful
review of the trial record shows that the testimony was
sufficiently believable.
On the basis of the above authority and the
evidence against appellant shown at trial, respondent prays
the verdict and sentence be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B.

HANSEN

Attorney General
"liLLIAM W.

BARRETT

Assistant Attorney General
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